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Organisation, Competitive Strategy and Business Performance. Abstract 
This paper develops and empirically tests a new methodology for evaluating the 
financial performance of takeovers. The existing accounting and event study 
methodologies do not adequately address the key issue of whether takeovers are 
a positive net present value investment for the acquiring company. Our 
methodology attempts this by employing the residual income approach to 
valuation, and comparing the present value of the acquirer’s future earnings 
before the acquisition, with those that actually result following takeover. In 
contrast to existing methodologies, we explicitly take account of the cost of the 
acquisition, the acquirers cost of capital, and the earnings which are created 
beyond the sample period. The methodology is used for evaluating a 
comprehensive sample of U.K. acquisitions completed during 1985-96. Using 
the traditional accounting method, we find that acquisitions result in a 
significant improvement in profitability. However, the residual income 
approach reveals that on average, acquisitions destroy roughly 30 percent of the 
acquirer’s pre-acquisition value.  
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 1. Introduction 
Takeovers are important events. In 1999, global mergers and acquisitions 
accounted for 2 percent of world-wide GDP (UNCTAD 2000). The financial 
performance of corporate takeovers is one of the most researched areas in 
industrial economics and financial economics. Despite this, the question of 
whether takeovers improve corporate performance is controversial.  
 
Accounting studies examine whether accounting performance improves after 
acquisition. This evidence is mixed with a small number of studies showing 
improvements in profitability, but the majority showing no improvement.1 
Event studies examine the stock market’s short-term reaction to the takeover 
announcement. These event studies show significant gains for target 
shareholders, and no gains or losses for acquiring shareholders, but significant 
gains overall. The much smaller number of event studies, which examine the 
long run share returns following acquisition find evidence of significantly 
negative losses. The interpretation of these stylised facts varies considerably. 
Some authors claim that the methodology used to measure long run share 
returns is not reliable and that takeovers create value both in terms of profits and 
short run share price gains (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001). In contrast, 
others argue that the long run negative share returns reflect overvaluation of 
takeovers at the time of announcement, which ultimately do not improve profits 
and destroy shareholder value (Tichy 2002).  
 
From the perspective of financial theory, a key question is whether the present 
value of the financial benefits from acquisition are greater than the present value 
of the costs, including the initial investment. What is at issue here is whether the 
marginal return from acquisition is greater than the marginal cost. However, 
neither the event study nor accounting study approaches are designed to address 
this key issue. The stock market reaction to a takeover bid reflects many factors, 
and not just the marginal impact of acquisition. The accounting studies on the 
other hand do not explicitly account for the cost of the acquisition, the time 
value of money, or profits earned beyond a limited post-acquisition period.  
 
During the last decade, accounting research has re-explored fundamental 
approaches to corporate valuation. In this spirit, models based on residual 
income have been developed (see e.g. Feltham and Ohlson 1995), and attained a 
widespread use in practical valuation settings (Penman 2000). In this paper we 
use the residual income approach to develop a metric for empirical evaluation of 
the financial performance of takeovers that is consistent with fundamental 
valuation theory and that hence overcomes some of the deficiencies of the event 
and accounting performance studies. In particular, we estimate the fundamental 
valuation of the bidder before the acquisition and compare this valuation with 
  
 
 the fundamental valuation following the acquisition. If takeovers create 
fundamental value, then the latter should be greater than the former.  
 
We apply this methodology to a comprehensive sample of domestic U.K. 
acquisitions involving public companies, completed between 1985 and 1996, 
and compare the results with those using the traditional accounting measure. We 
find that, when using the traditional accounting method, acquisitions result in a 
significant improvement in return on equity. However, when using the residual 
income approach, acquisitions result in a significantly lower fundamental value 
of the acquiring company than existed prior to acquisition. Our conclusion is 
that acquisitions actually destroy fundamental value.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses why the traditional 
approaches fail to measure the marginal impact of acquisition. Section 3 
reviews the residual income approach to valuation, and develops a model based 
on this approach to measure takeover performance. Section 4 describes the data 
and sample statistics. Section 5 reports the results from the empirical analysis. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Why Event and Accounting Studies do not Measure the Impact of 
Takeover on Fundamental Valuation 
 
2.1 Event studies 
There are several reasons why stock market reaction at the time of the 
announcement of an acquisition may not reflect whether the acquisition has a 
positive impact on fundamental valuation or not.  
 
An acquisition announcement provides a bundle of signals all of which generate 
information,  
that is reflected in the security price of the acquiring company. These signals 
give information on the event itself, the identity of the acquirer, and the method 
of payment, among others. For example, studies have shown that acquirers 
using stock as the method of payment experience lower returns than those using 
cash. One explanation for this empirical finding is that acquirers offer stock 
when they are overvalued by the stock market (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
 
Alternatively, when a firm takes on any new project with a positive net present 
value, the market value of the firm will be affected, depending on whether the 
NPV meets expectations. If a firm is expected to take on high positive NPV 
projects, then this expectation will be built into value. Even if the new projects 
taken on by the firm have a positive NPV, there may be a drop in value if the 
NPV does not meet the high expectations of the stock market. 
  
 
 To disentangle the impact on stock prices of these signals and thereby evaluate 
whether the marginal benefit of the acquisition is greater than the cost is very 
difficult. 
 
2.2 Accounting studies 
There are several reasons why the accounting studies do not measure the impact 
of an acquisition on fundamental value.  
 
The methodology typically used addresses the question of whether the post-
merger performance of the merging firms differs from the pre-merger 
performance. Such accounting indicators are not clearly related to whether the 
acquisition is a net NPV positive investment for the acquirer or not. Firstly, the 
appropriate consideration is the marginal return brought by the acquisition 
compared to the acquirer’s cost of capital. The pre-merger performance of the 
acquired company is of no relevance here.  
 
Some studies have alternatively considered the difference between the post-bid 
performance of the acquirer with the pre-bid performance of the acquirer only 
(Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos 1997): Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1997). 
However, whether acquirer performance improves or deteriorates does not tell 
us whether fundamental value is created. This requires estimation of whether 
the additional profit returns brought about by the acquisition are greater than the 
cost of capital. In other words the profitability of the acquirer could be lower 
following acquisition, but the marginal profitability may be higher than the cost 
of capital, or vice versa. 
 
It is therefore important to compare the marginal profitability associated with 
the acquisition to the acquirers cost of capital. Furthermore, studies tend to give 
equal weight to each post-takeover year. However, if the timing of profits is of 
crucial importance in establishing whether acquisitions improve fundamental 
valuation. It is therefore important to weight future profits by the cost of capital 
to represent the higher value accorded to profits which occur sooner rather than 
later. Since acquisitions have important effects on capital structure and hence 
the cost of capital (Ghosh and Jain 2000), it is the post-acquisition cost of 
capital which is relevant here. 
 
Furthermore, in both the above types of studies, the profitability measure is 
adjusted for factors such as industry and size. Takeovers are classified as 
successful if they outperform the expected performance of similar size and/or 
industry counterfactuals. However, this adjustment says nothing about whether 
the relative performance is sufficient in absolute terms. A return that is worse 
  
 
 than that of the control firms can still be satisfactory compared to the cost of 
capital and vice versa. 
 
Another serious drawback of the existent literature is the treatment of goodwill. 
Since their objective is to compare the post-acquisition performance of the 
merged firms with the pre-acquisition of the merged firms, the inclusion of 
purchased goodwill on the merged firms books following the acquisition 
produces a downward bias on profitability change.2 Studies have typically 
therefore subtracted goodwill from the merged firms’ assets and added back 
amortisation to the profitability measure.3 The studies have effectively 
converted the profitability effect into that that would occur with the pooling 
method.4 As a result, the cost of the acquisition is not incorporated into the 
performance measure. Acquiring firms can pay a higher premium and therefore 
reduce the fundamental valuation of the acquisition, but this will not be 
reflected in the accounting performance measurement.  
 
Most profit studies ignore the profitability beyond an initial (usually 3-5 years) 
post-acquisition period.5 However, the returns beyond this period are crucial to 
understanding the fundamental valuation of the acquisition.  
  
Our methodology attempts to overcome the above shortcomings by taking into 
account only the performance of the acquiring company, by comparing profit 
returns with the cost of capital, by taking into account performance beyond the 





3.1 Traditional accounting performance methodology 
The first method we employ to examine the impact of merger is the traditional 
accounting performance technique using a return on equity profit measure. The 
performance data of the bidder and target firms before the takeover is 
aggregated to obtain the pro forma pre-takeover performance of the combined 
firms. Comparing the post-takeover performance of the bidder with this pre-
takeover benchmark provides a measure of the change in performance.  
 
To correct for the effects of size and industry, we calculate profit returns 
relative to non-merging control firms selected on the basis of industry and size, 
as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). The control firms are selected from 
firms listed on Datastream, which neither made, nor received, a takeover offer 
for a public company during the five years before and after the acquisition. The 
control firms are selected by first matching each sample firm to all non-merging 
  
 
 firms in the same Datastream FTSE Actuaries industrial classification level 5.6 
Secondly, to match on size, we select the firm in the same industrial code with 
the book value of assets closest to sample firms’ asset size in the year prior to 
takeover. 
 
The relative profit returns are the differences between values for the combined 
firms and values for the weighted-average control firms. In the pre-takeover 
period the weights for the control firms are the relative book equity size of 
bidders and targets estimated at the beginning of each year, whilst in the post-
takeover period the weights are the relative equity sizes of bidders and targets in 
year -1. We focus our analysis on the four years before the takeover and the four 
years following the takeover. Consistent with previous studies, but inconsistent 
with our proposed residual income approach, we exclude year 0 from the 
analysis.7 
The proper post-takeover benchmark must take account of any above average 
high or low pre-takeover performance, otherwise some of the difference 
between pre- and post-takeover performance could be due to mean reversions 
that have been documented in prior studies (see e.g., Fama and French 2000). 8 
In order to allow for mean reversion, we adopt the methodology employed by 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), where the effect of takeover is measured as 
the intercept of a cross sectional regression of post-takeover relative profit 
returns on the corresponding pre-takeover returns as follows; 
 
i PRE POST ROE ROE      
                                                     Eq. 1 
where ROEPOST is the median annual relative ROE for the combined firm from 
the post-takeover years and ROEPRE is the pre-takeover relative median for the 
same combined firm. Our measure of the effect of takeover on profit returns is 
the intercept  from Eq. (1). The slope coefficient  captures any systematic 
relation in profit returns between the pre and post-takeover years so that  
ROEPRE measures the effect of the pre-takeover performance on post-takeover 




 3.2 Model development based on the residual income model  
 
3.21 The basic residual income model 
The valuation method we use in this study is a discounted residual income 
approach sometimes referred to as the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson valuation 
technique.9 In this section, we present the basic residual income model and 
briefly develop the intuition behind the model. 
A stock’s fundamental value is typically defined as the present value of 

















                                                                                    Eq. 2 
 
Vt is the stocks fundamental valuation at time t, Et (Dt+i) is the expected future 
dividends for period t+i conditional on information available at time t, and re is 
the cost of equity capital based on the information set at time t. This definition 
assumes a flat term-structure of interest rates.  
Ohlson (1990, 1995) demonstrates that, as long as a firms earnings and book 
value are forecast in a manner consistent with “clean surplus” accounting,10 the 
intrinsic value defined in Eq. (1) can be rewritten as the reported book value, 
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                                               Eq. 4 
 
where  Bt = book value at time t,  Et[·] = expectation based on information 
available at time t, NI = Net Income for period t+i, re = cost of equity capital, 
and ROE t+i = the after-tax return on book equity for period t+i.  
 
This equation is identical to a dividend discount model, but expresses firm value 
in terms of accounting numbers. It therefore relies on the same theory and is 
subject to the same theoretical limitations as the dividend discount model. 
However, the model provides a framework for analysing the relation between 




 Eq.(4) offers several important insights for equity valuation. First, it splits firm 
valuation into two components – a measure of the capital invested (Bt) and a 
measure of the present value of all future residual income. If a firm always earns 
income at a rate exactly equal to its cost of equity capital, then this term is zero 
and Vt = Bt. However, firms whose expected ROEs are higher (lower) than re 
have firm values greater (lesser) than their book values.11 
 
Several recent studies evaluate this model’s ability to explain cross-sectional 
prices and expected returns. Frankel and Lee (1998) find that the V measure 
(estimated using forecasts) explains close to 70 percent of cross-sectional stock 
prices in the U.S. and that the V/P ratio is a better predictor of cross-sectional 
returns than B/P. Frankel and Lee (1997) employ the model in an international 
context and find similar results in cross-border valuations. 
 
3.22 Applying the residual Income Model to estimate takeover performance 
The fundamental valuation model in Eq. (4) can be used for evaluating takeover 
performance. We use the residual income approach to examine whether the 
fundamental valuation of the acquiring company is greater after the acquisition 
than it is before. Unlike either the accounting or event studies, this method 
allows for the time value of money, acquisition benefits beyond the sample 
period, and the goodwill expenditure on the acquisition. The difference in 
valuations, or what we term value creation (VC), is the marginal change in 











































                            Eq. 5 
 
The left-hand term is based on actual ROEs, whereas, the right hand term is 
based on expected ROEs. VC must exceed zero for the takeover to create value. 
Two important measurement problems are apparent. Firstly, it is not empirically 
possible to measure residual income for an infinite period following acquisition. 
Because most previous takeover studies cover a time period of 5 years 
following acquisition, we select a post-takeover period equal to five years to 
measure actual residual income. We therefore require an estimate of future 
value creation beyond this 5-year period for the acquirer.  Secondly, it is not 
possible to measure residual income for the buyer as if no acquisition took 
place. One possible way to measure both these variables is with market values. 
One can argue that the pre-acquisition market value minus equity book value is 
a reasonable proxy for expected future value creation of the acquiring firm as a 
  
 
 stand-alone company. One can further argue that the market value minus equity 
book value at the end of the 5-year post-acquisition period is a reasonable proxy 
for the remaining value creation of the acquirer.12 We therefore propose the 
following evaluation procedure to measure value creation: 

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                         Eq. 6 
where M(B) is the market value of shareholders equity. The first component 
indicates the actual value creation for post-acquisition years zero through four. 
The second component reflects the expected marginal value creation beyond 
year four. The third component is the pre-acquisition value premium, which 
expresses the amount of value generation that was expected before the takeover. 
In order to compare the value creation measure across acquirers of different 
size, we divide each component of Eq. (6) by the pre-bid market value of the 
acquiring firm.  
 
In order to control for general stock market and industry factors, which may 
affect the change in valuation and residual income of acquirers in the post-
takeover period, we employ a control firm technique. For each acquirer we 
select a non-acquiring control firm matched on size and industry, and estimate 
Eq.(6) (after dividing each component by the pre-bid market value) for the 
control firm as well as the acquirer. Value creation is the difference between the 
value creation measure for the acquirers and the control firms.    
 
3.23 Adjusting the residual income model for violations of clean surplus 
accounting 
The model described above rests crucially on the assumption of clean surplus 
accounting. However, the accounting methods used by acquiring companies can 
involve violations of this assumption and therefore the residual income 
measurement in Eq. (6) needs to be subsequently adjusted. In the U.K. over the 
period of our study (1985-96) companies could account for acquisition using 
either acquisition or merger accounting. Acquisition accounting involves 
capitalising goodwill on the acquirer’s balance sheet and amortising it over its 
economic life. If this method is employed, then the residual income described in 
Eq (6) does not need to be adjusted because it already incorporates the cost of 
the acquisition.13  
 
However, if the transaction is accounted for using the merger method where the 
two parties’ accounts are added together without any goodwill being capitalised, 
the value creation measure needs to include a deduction for the goodwill paid.14 
  
 
 In the U.K. prior to 1998, nearly all acquiring firms used the acquisition method 
but then immediately wrote-off the purchased goodwill from their equity 
(Higson, 1998). This gives a result, which is identical to that of merger 
accounting, and for acquiring firms using this method, goodwill needs to be 
deducted.15 A straightforward interpretation of the deduction is that the higher 
the price paid the more value must be generated in order to justify the price.16 
 
As well as incorporating the goodwill costs associated with the sample 
acquisition, we must take account of the subsequent treatment of goodwill 
associated with further acquisitions in the post-takeover period. For acquiring 
firms that do not capitalise goodwill for further acquisitions in the post-takeover 
period, we subtract the present value of further goodwill that is not capitalised 
from the value creation measure. These two deductions for goodwill result in 
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   Eq. 7 
 
where GW0 is goodwill not capitalised for the year of acquisition, and GW1-4 is 
goodwill not capitalised for other acquisitions during the 5 year period.  
 
Henceforth, the first component in Eq. (7) will be referred to as residual income 
or RI. The second and last components will be referred to as the value premiums 
or VP. The third and fourth components will be referred to as goodwill non-
capitalised or GW. 
 
Given the method described in Eq. (7), the treatment of goodwill by acquirers, 
that is whether they capitalise or do not capitalise goodwill, will not have an 
effect on the value creation measure.  
 
Finally, to control for other problems of dirty surplus accounting which occur 
following acquisition such as extraordinary items and write-downs to fair values 
(Chatterjee and Meeks 1996), we employ a further measure of residual income. 
Rather than trying to incorporate such violations individually, we employ an all-
inclusive residual income measure defined as: 
t
t t t t t B
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 where Dt is dividends and St is share issues. This all-inclusive ROE measure 
(ROEAI) should be used in the first term of Eq. (7) instead of the ROE defined 
above. When the all-inclusive measure is used there is no need to adjust for 
goodwill not capitalised, and the goodwill adjustments are excluded from the 
calculations. This first term is henceforth referred to as the residual income all-
inclusive measure or RIAI. The value creation measure using the all-inclusive 
residual income method is referred to as VCAI. 
 
4. Sample Descriptives and Variable Definitions 
 
4.1 Sample descriptives 
We test the above methodology on a comprehensive sample of acquisitions of 
U.K. public companies by other U.K. public companies, completed between 
January 1985 and December 1996. The sample acquisitions are drawn from the 
monthly periodical Acquisitions Monthly. Takeovers are defined as occurring 
when the acquirer owns less than 50 percent of the target’s shares before the 
takeover, and increases its ownership to at least 50 percent as a result of the 
takeover. We exclude takeovers if either bidder or target accounting and share 
price data is not held on the Datastream Database for a minimum period of one 
year prior to and one year following takeover. This procedure results in a 
sample of 386 acquisitions.  
 
The characteristics of the sample acquisitions are described in Table 1. The 
number of sample acquisitions is greater in the 1980s than in the early to mid-
1990s. 62 percent of our sample acquisitions took place during 1985-1989. The 
average acquirer market value of equity is very large at £858m. The 
corresponding average target size is £174m, and the average relative size is 
0.44. Therefore, the sample of acquisitions represents significant investments 
for the acquirers. The value of the target companies at the announcement of 
acquisition is significantly greater than their book values, with an average 







 Table 1. Sample statistics 
 
Panel A: Completion year 
   Number    Percent 
1985   48    12.4 
1986   40    10.4 
1987 63    16.3 
1988 52    13.5 
1989 36    9.3 
1990 23    6.0 
1991 25    6.5 
1992 19    4.9 
1993 19    4.9 
1994 17    4.4 
1995 27    7.0 
1996 16    4.1 
Total 386    100.0 
Panel B: Company and transaction characteristics 
 Average    Median 
Acquirer size market value at announcement (£m)  858.76    175.01 
Target size market value at announcement (£m)  174.15    26.75 
Relative size at announcement  0.44    0.24 
Acquirer MTBV at announcement  2.99    1.87 
Target MTBV at announcement  2.38    2.41 
Bid premium ( percent)  37.8    32.6 
 
Panel A reports the sample acquisitions by completion year. Panel B 
reports acquirer and target characteristics, and transaction characteristics. 
The bid premium is estimated as the difference between the transaction 




4.2 Variable definitions  
The variables we use and their definitions are described in Table 2. The profit 
measure we employ for return on equity in both the traditional method and the 
residual income method consists of net income (Datastream Variable 182), 
scaled by the beginning-period book value of ordinary shareholders funds 
(Datastream Variable 305).  
 
To calculate the acquirers’ value premium at acquisition, we use the acquirers’ 
market value 4 months prior to bid announcement,17 and subtract from this the 
acquirer’s book value in the last year prior to consolidation (year -1). To 
calculate the value premium 5-years after merger, we take the market value 60  
  
 
 months following completion and subtract from this the acquirers’ book value 
in the 5
th year after acquisition.  
We estimate the firm specific costs of equity using the CAPM model. Firm 
betas are calculated for each post-acquisition year using the previous 240 
trading day share returns. For each post-acquisition year, we estimate the cost of 
equity by adding the risk free rate to the firm beta multiplied by the risk 
premium. The risk free rate is the return on U.K. government bonds 
(Datastream variable AUKGVALRI). The risk premium is the return on the 
FTSE All Share Index (Datastream variable FTALLSHRI) minus the risk free 
rate. For each firm, the cost of equity is the average over the 5 post-takeover 
years.18
,19 We assume that there are six months on average between the bid 
completion date and the consolidation year, and therefore the discount rate for 
the year of consolidation is for 6 months only.  
 
We estimate goodwill written off, both in the acquisition year and in subsequent 
years 1-4, as the total goodwill paid (Datastream variable 498), minus the 
increase in capitalised goodwill (Datastream Variable 343) minus goodwill 
amortised (Datastream variable 562). The vast majority of our sample acquirers 
write off goodwill immediately to reserves, which is consistent with the 
evidence of Higson (1998). We compare the change in total goodwill 
(Datastream variable 343) in the year of the acquisition, with the expected 
goodwill given the bid value and the equity value of the target (Datastream 
variable 305). We find that of the 386 acquisitions, only 10 acquirers actually 
capitalise the acquired goodwill following acquisition. Of the remaining 376 
acquirers, 276 do not have any capitalised goodwill for either the year of 
acquisition or the four post-acquisition years. The remaining 100 acquirers 
either already had capitalised goodwill at acquisition or capitalised it in the four 
years following the acquisition.  
  
 
 Table 2. Variable definitions and calculations 
 
Variable    Definition   Calculation using Datastream variables  
RI  Residual income. Residual income for each year 0 to 4 is net income (DS 182) divided by shareholders equity (DS 305), minus the cost of 
equity (re), then multiplied by shareholders equity. The cost of equity is calculated using CAPM over years 0-4. The annual residual 
income figures are discounted to present values using the cost of equity, summed for years 0-4, then divided by the market value of 
shareholders equity (DS MV) in year –1. 
  Σ
4
i=0 [(182t / 305t-1 – re ) * 305t-1 / (1 + 
re)
t ] / MV-1   
RIAI  Residual income all-inclusive. All-inclusive residual income return is calculated for each year 0-4 by firstly taking the change in annual 
shareholders equity (DS 305) plus annual dividends paid (DS 187) minus share issues [calculated as share issue for acquisition (DS 414) 
and share issue for cash (DS 412)], and dividing by shareholders equity. The cost of equity is subtracted from this return, which is then 
multiplied by shareholders equity. The annual residual income figures are discounted to present values using the cost of equity, summed 
for years 0-4, then divided by the market value of shareholders equity in year –1. 
  Σ
4
i=0 {[(305t – 305t-1 + 187t – 414t – 
412t) / 305t ] – re}  *  305t-1/ (1 + re)
t   / 
MV-1 
VP0  Value premium in year 0. Market value of shareholders equity (DS MV) 4 months prior to acquisition announcement month (notated as 





(MV0 – 305-1) / MV-1 
VP4  Value premium in year 4. Market value of shareholders equity (DS MV) 60 months after the acquisition completion month (notated as 
year four), minus shareholders equity in year 4. This is discounted to the present value using the cost of equity, then divided by the market 
value of equity in year –1. 
(MV4 – 3054) / (1 + re)
4 / MV-1 
GWo  Goodwill not capitalised in year 0. Calculated as annual goodwill expenditure (DS 498) minus annual change in total goodwill capital (DS 
343) minus annual goodwill amortisation (DS 562). This is divided by the market value of equity in year –1. 
[4980 – (3430 – 343 -1) – 5620 ] / MV-1 
GW1-4  Goodwill not capitalised in years 1-4. Calculated as annual goodwill expenditure (DS 498) minus annual change in total goodwill capital 
(DS 343) minus annual goodwill amortisation (DS 562). The annual figures are discounted to present values using the cost of equity, 
summed for years 1-4 and then divided by the market value of equity in year –1. 
  Σ
4
i=1 [498t – (343t  – 343 t-1) – 562t] / (1 
+ re)
t   / MV-1 
VC  Value creation.    RI  - GW0 – GW1-4 + VP4  – VP0. 
VCAI  Value creation all-inclusive.     RIAI + VP4  – VP0 
 
This Table gives the definitions for the components of the value creation measure, and their Datastream (DS) definitions. Year -1 is the last 
financial year prior to the acquisition, year 0 is the year of consolidation. For the all-inclusive residual income measure, dividends are measured by the 
Datastream variable 187, and share issues are measured by Datastream variables 
412 (equity issued for cash) and 414 (equity issued for acquisition).  
 
If acquirers die within the 5 post-takeover years then the year of death 
essentially becomes the final year of evaluation, for both the acquirer and the 
control firm. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Results using the traditional accounting performance method 
Table 3 reports the results using the traditional accounting performance 
measure. The combined ROE of the acquired and acquiring firms increases over 
the 4 years prior to acquisition, from 8.86 percent in year –4 to 13.25 percent in 
year –1. The median ROE for the 4 pre-takeover years is 11.75 percent. The 
combined ROE of the control firms also increases over the pre-takeover period, 
but is notably lower than the merging firms in the year prior to acquisition. The 
merging firms’ median ROE is 1 percent higher than the control firms over the 
4 year pre-takeover period.  
 
In the post-takeover period there is a dramatic increase in ROE for the merging 
firms, which increases to over 15 percent in years 0, 1 and 2, before falling back 
to 13 percent in years 3 and 4. The median ROE for years 1 to 4 is 14.9 percent 
and significantly higher than the pre-takeover ROE. The change in the control 
firms combined ROE also increases (to 12 percent) over the post-takeover 
period but insignificantly, indicating that the improvement in the merging firms’ 
ROE is not driven by size or industry factors. The median difference between 
the control firm adjusted pre- and post-takeover ROE is significantly significant 
at the 10 percent level. The proportion of adjusted post-bid ROEs which are 
greater than the adjusted pre-bid ROEs is 58 percent, significant at the 5 percent 
level.  
 
These differences may understate the true improvement in performance if some 
regression to the mean in ROE was expected for acquirers, given their above 
average pre-bid ROE. To allow for this we estimate Eq. (1). The intercept from 
this regression has a value of 4.27 percent, which is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. This indicates that there is a 4.27 percent per year increase 
in post-takeover return on equity after the pre-takeover ROE is controlled for.  
  
 Table 3. The  effect of takeover on the accounting rate of return of the merged 
companies 
 









- 4  249  8.86  9.79  0.25 
- 3  300  10.13  10.97  0.36 
- 2  351  12.32  12.42  -0.06 
- 1  386  13.25  11.55  1.99 
Median ROE for years - 4 to -1  386  11.75  10.74  0.79 
0 386  15.24  12.59  1.83 
1 386  15.76  12.52  3.23 
2 359  15.42  12.26  2.42 
3 335  13.67  12.37  1.47 
4 271  13.04  11.26  1.01 
Median ROE for years 1 to 4  386  14.90  12.00  2.76 
Median difference in pre- and post-bid   386  2.66 
a  0.66 2.28 
c 
ROE   (4.12)  (0.91)  (1.86) 
Proportion of post-bid ROE > pre-bid   386  0.65 
a  0.52 0.58 
b 
ROE    -(4.55) -(0.58) -(2.37) 
 
This Table reports the return on equity (ROE) for merged firms and non-merging control 
firms matched on industry and size, for the 4 pre-takeover years and the 4 post-takeover 
years. Year 0 is the year of consolidation. ROE is defined as net income divided by beginning 
value of shareholders’ equity. Pre-takeover returns for the combined firm are weighted 
averages of bidder and target, with the weights being the relative book equity values of the 
two firms.  
a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively, 
using a two tailed test . 
 
We conclude that overall, the results indicate that in the post-takeover period, 
there is a significant improvement in the merging firms’ return on equity, 
compared to the pre-takeover period. This conclusion is consistent with the 
results of Chatterjee and Meeks (1996), for acquisitions that took place during 
1984-90. It is also consistent with the operating performance results of Higson 
(1998), Manson, Powell, Stark and Thomas (2000), and Carline, Linn, and 
Yadav (2002). In contrast to their results for 1984-90, Chatterjee and Meeks 
(1996) find no positive impact of acquisitions during 1977-83 and hypothesise 
that the improvement in the former period may be due to the relatively 




 5.2 Results using the residual income method and the all-inclusive residual 
income method 
 
5.21 Results using the residual income method 
In this section we report the results of the residual income approach. Table 4 
reports the results of estimating Eq. (7) for all acquirers, using both median and 
mean measures.  The median measures are shown graphically in Figure 1. 
The acquirers’ market values are roughly double their equity book values in 
year 0. The control firms market values are higher than book values, but the 
value premium is significantly higher for acquirers compared to control firms. 
The present value of residual income created in years 1-4 is on average 12 
percent of the acquirers’ initial market value. The median figure is 5 percent. 
This appears to be a respectable return, especially compared to the control firms 
whose average return is less than the cost of equity. The difference between 
acquirers and control firms is significant both for the average and median 
measures.  
 
However, this superior performance does not take into account the goodwill 
paid to acquire the sample target or subsequent targets, which were not 
capitalised and hence were excluded from the residual income. These costs are 
significant and have an important effect on the value creation measure. The 
goodwill paid on average by acquirers in the sample acquisition is 25 percent of 
their pre-acquisition market value. Since acquirers do not include this goodwill 
on their balance sheets, any value created will have to be greater than this figure 
if the acquisition is to create value overall. The acquirers on average carried out 
further acquisitions over the 5 post-takeover years. The median present value of 
future goodwill paid is equal to 15 percent of the acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
market value. Total non-capitalised goodwill is larger than the residual income 
earned in the post-takeover period. However, if the present value of future 
residual income is sufficient to cover the difference (and the initial market 
expectation of residual income to be generated) then the acquisition should be 
considered value creative. This is not the case. The present value of the 
difference between the acquirers’ market value in year 4 and its equity book 
value is 41 percent (median value) of the acquirers’ market value in year 0. The 
value of the expected future residual income in year 4 plus the residual income 
earned during years 0-4, minus the non-capitalised goodwill is significantly less 
than the expected future residual income in year 0. The overall loss is equal to 
32 percent of the acquirers’ initial market value in terms of the average and 43 
percent in terms of the median. 
 
  
 To examine whether this value destruction is due to a downturn in the stock 
market or because of a downturn in the acquirers’ industry, we compare the 
figures with those of control firms. We also find for the control firms that the 
market value minus book value does not grow at a faster rate than the firms’ 
cost of equity. However, the major difference is that unlike the acquirers, the 
control firms do not incur expenditure on non-capitalised goodwill. The 
difference between acquirers and control firms in terms of overall value 
destruction is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both the average 
and median measures.  
 
One argument could be that acquirers are overvalued at acquisition and that our 
measure simply reflects a mean reversion in share prices over the post-takeover 
period (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). However, we find that our acquirers  
 
Table 4. The effect of takeover on the intrinsic value of the acquirer using the 
residual income approach  
 
Variable   Acquirer  Control  firm  Difference 
Panel A: Averages 
RI   0.12  -0.07  0.19 
a 
GW0
   0.24  0.00  0.24 
a 
GW1-4   0.68  0.17  0.52 
a 
VP4   0.89  0.50  0.39 
b 
VP0   0.40  0.25  0.16 
c 
VC    -0.32  0.01  -0.33 
a 
Panel B: Medians 
RI   0.05  0.02  0.03 
a 
GW0
   0.12  0.00  0.12 
a 
GW1-4   0.15  0.05  0.10 
a 
VP4   0.41  0.32  0.09 
b 
VP0    0.54  0.40  0.14 
a 
VC    -0.43  -0.13  -0.30 
a 
 
This Table reports the results of estimating value creation. The definitions of each component 
are shown in Table 2.  Year -1 is the last financial year prior to the acquisition, year 0 is the 
year of consolidation. Each variable has been winsorized at the 99th percentile. The tests used 
to test differences in the mean and median are a t-test and the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
a, 
  




experience a similar pattern in market-to-book values as the control firms. 
Besides, the key factor driving the value destruction would not appear to be the 
decrease in market-to-book value but instead the non-capitalised goodwill 
expenditure. In order to investigate this further we examine the results using the 
all-inclusive residual income measure. 
 
Figure 1. The effect of takeover on the intrinsic value of the acquirer using the 





















This Figure shows the median values for the different components of value creation, for both 








VP0 RI GW0 GW1-4 VP4 VC
Components of value creation
Acquirer Control firm
 
5.22 Results using the residual income all-inclusive method 
The results using the all-inclusive measure are reported in Table 5. The market 
value minus book measures are identical to those in Table 4. The all-inclusive 
net income measure takes account of the goodwill expenditure which is not 
capitalised. The average figure is negative and equal to 38 percent of the 
acquirers’ initial market value. This figure is much larger than the difference in 
the expected value of residual income at time 0 (measured by market value 
minus book) and the expected value of future residual income at year 4. This 
confirms the finding that by including non-capitalised goodwill, the value 
created by the sample acquisitions is significantly negative, and that this result 
is not driven by a decline in stock market returns. Our basic metric therefore 
appears robust to the violations of clean surplus accounting discussed by 
O’Hanlon and Pope (1999). 
  
 Table 5. The effect of takeover on the intrinsic value of the acquirer using the 
all-inclusive residual income approach  
 
Variable   Acquirer  Control  firm  Difference 
Panel A: Averages 
RIAI   -0.38  -0.14  -0.24 
a 
VP4   0.67  0.48  0.19 
c 
VP0   0.41  0.26  0.15 
VC    -0.12  0.08  -0.20 
b 
Panel B: Medians  
RIAI   -0.22  -0.09  -0.13 
a 
VP4   0.42  0.33  0.09 
b 
VP0   0.56  0.41  0.15 
a 
VC    -0.32  -0.13  -0.19 
a 
 
This Table reports the results of estimating value creation with the all-inclusive net income 
measure. The definitions of each component are shown in Table 2.  Year -1 is the last 
financial year prior to the acquisition, whilst year 0 is the year of consolidation. Each variable 
has been winsorized at the 99th percentile. The tests used to test differences in the mean and 
median are a t-test and the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
a, b, c indicate statistical significance 




In this paper we have developed a methodology for evaluating takeover success 
which measures whether the fundamental valuation of the acquirer is greater 
after the acquisition than it was beforehand. Our methodology employs the 
residual income approach to fundamental valuation, and differs from previous 
event and accounting studies which are not designed to directly address this 
issue. The stock market reaction to a takeover bid reflects many factors, such as 
signalling overvalued stock, as well as the marginal impact of acquisition. 
Alternatively, accounting studies do not explicitly account for the cost of 
acquisition and the time value of money. In order to create fundamental value, 
acquirers must outperform the pre-merger expectations formed by the stock 
market and exceed the value creation achieved by non-merging control firms. 
 
We test this methodology on a comprehensive sample of 386 takeovers between 
U.K. public companies, completed between 1985 and 1996. Using the 
traditional accounting study approach, we find that merger has a significantly 
positive impact on the return on equity. This finding runs contrary to the 
majority of earlier U.K. studies, but is consistent with U.K. studies for our time 
period. Our results using the residual income approach are in stark contrast to 
  
   
 
 
those using the traditional approach. We find that the fundamental valuation of 
acquirers is significantly lower after the acquisition than it is before the 
acquisition. The acquirers’ value destruction relative to control firms 
corresponds to 30 percent of their pre-acquisition market value. The difference 
in performance is not driven by lower returns on equity, but instead the 
deduction of goodwill expenditure, which is not capitalised at the time of 
acquisition. 
 
One potential weakness in our approach is the use of market values, since 
acquirers typically experience negative share returns in the long-run period 
following acquisition. Future work should therefore estimate the robustness of 
these results using forecasts of future residual income, which do not rely on 
market values. Another line of enquiry is which factors have an impact on 
fundamental value creation. In this regard it is important to examine the impact 
of the bid premium on fundamental value creation. Given the method used by 
traditional methods in dealing with goodwill, higher bid premiums are unlikely 
to have an impact on the accounting performance. However, ceteris paribus, the 
higher the bid premium the lower the increase in fundamental value of the 
acquirer. Our methodology therefore appears well suited to examine this issue. 
 
The overriding conclusion from our results is that the traditional accounting 
methodology provides a very weak, and in our case contradictory, guide to the 
















1 For reviews see Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Tichy (2002).  
2 Prior research has generally not disclosed information regarding accounting 
methods, although Singh (1971) and Meeks (1977) conclude that their re-
sults are not sensitive to alternative goodwill treatments. 
3 See for example, Opler and Weston (1993). 
4 For an exception see Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1997). 
5 For an exception see Chatterjee and Meeks (1996). 
6 This industrial code is similar in detail to the 2 digit U.K. Standard Industrial  
Classification and is based on 51 different industries. 
7 In separate tests, we included year 0 and therefore examine 5 years of post-
acquisition data. Our results were unchanged by this alternative method.  
8 In our case, we find that acquirers have above average ROE before acquisition 
and that this improves further following acquisition. Therefore, the impli-
cation is that once we take mean reversion into account, the improvement 
in ROE may be even larger. 
9 Theoretical developments of this valuation method are found in Ohlson (1990, 
1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995). Earlier treatments can be found in 
Preinreich (1938) and Edwards and Bell (1961). 
10 The notion of clean surplus accounting states that all changes in the book 
value of equity have to pass the income statement, except for capital 
transactions between company and owners (Bt = Bt-1 + NIt – Dt). The 
all-inclusive principle of accounting is also often used to describe the 
same concept. 
11 In the short run, a company can maintain abnormal profits, due to extreme 
barriers to entry or some other sustainable competitive advantage. How-
ever, in the long run, abnormal profits should be expected to be elimi-
nated by competitive forces (Fama and French, 2000). 
12 Frankel and Lee (1998) show that market values tend to gravitate towards in-
trinsic values. 
13 This is also the case when goodwill is capitalised on the balance sheet but 
not amortised, as is now the case in the U.S.  
14 This could be an implicit rather than explicit premium if the merger is ef-
fected by creating a new company which acquires both existing compa-
nies. However, this type of transaction is very rare in the U.K. and did not 
occur for any of our sample takeovers. 
15 O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) find that the four most important violations of 
clean surplus accounting in the U.K. over our sample time period are pur-  
 
 
chased goodwill written off against shareholders’ equity, asset revalua-
tion, foreign currency translation and extraordinary items. 
16 This occurs via a higher absolute capital charge and subsequent goodwill 
amortisation when goodwill is capitalised with the acquisition method. 
17 We use market valuation four months prior to exclude the consequences of 
pre-bid market anticipation, since Schwert (1996) shows that stock mar-
kets tend to anticipate a bid some months beforehand. In separate tests, 
we used the acquirers’ market value in the month prior to acquisition. The 
results were unchanged. 
18 We also carried out the analysis using the yearly cost of equity rather than 
the average 5-year measure. The results were unchanged. 
19 In three cases Datastream did not report a beta for the acquiring firms. In this 
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